

Values at the Water's Edge: Social Welfare Values and Foreign Aid

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Abstract

What explains variation in public opinion about foreign aid in donor countries? The conventional wisdom points to the importance of values related to the welfare state such as economic ideology. Scholars argue that liberals, who support redistribution at home, also support redistribution abroad in the form of foreign aid. Yet, the conditions under which individuals apply values learned in the domestic political context to issues of foreign policy remain undertheorized. In this article, I argue that ideology interacts with foreign policy orientation – individuals' placement along the internationalist/isolationist spectrum – to shape mass attitudes towards foreign aid. Using data from public opinion surveys fielded in the U.S., UK, and Norway, I show that ideology is strongly associated with support for foreign aid among internationalists, but has little effect on isolationists' foreign aid preferences. This effect is due to a split among liberals: Liberal internationalists strongly favor foreign aid, but liberal isolationists oppose it. These findings help explain why support for foreign aid is so low in some countries, why domestic welfare programs are often more popular than foreign aid, and why some countries have generous welfare states but are foreign aid laggards. The theory and findings have important implications more generally for understanding the externalization of domestic political values to issues of foreign policy.

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1 Introduction

In February 2014, the United Kingdom Independence Party initiated a campaign to divert foreign aid funds to help needy Britons. In a rally promoting this initiative, Nigel Farage, the party leader, stated, “Anyone with an ounce of common sense knows that a government’s primary duty is to the well-being of its own citizens. *Charity begins at home* and it is not mean-spirited to say that, it is just basic common sense.”¹ Yet, the English proverb “Charity begins at home” has been used over time to convey two diametrically opposed sentiments. Its original intent was to remind individuals that values related to compassion and charity should be encouraged in the home and should then extend beyond it into society. By the 1700s, however, the proverb had come to be used by those expressing the opposite feeling, that charity begins at home and ends there.² The dual meanings of this proverb illuminate an important puzzle in the literature that relates the welfare state to foreign aid: why do some individuals and countries externalize values related to the welfare state to foreign aid and others do not?

Although scholars find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that values and norms associated with the welfare state lead to foreign aid (e.g., Lumsdaine (1993), Noël and Thérien (1995), Milner and Tingley (2013*b*)), they underestimate that for some, support for redistribution stops at the water’s edge. Indeed, we can see evidence of this fact in public opinion data from the United States. In the American National Election Study over the past twenty years, a robust pattern emerges: A significant number of respondents — more than twenty percent in each survey year — support domestic welfare programs but oppose foreign aid. This observation is inconsistent with existing theories that foreign aid attitudes and

¹Emphasis added. Quote from: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2552969/Ukips-Nigel-Farage-calls-foreign-aid-budget-used-help-flood-hit-communities.html>

²In a book on morality published in 1790, an English writer notes, “This Proverb has been generally misunderstood and misapplied. It has been conceived to allude to the folly of giving to others what we want ourselves; and covetous men have used it in justification of their own selfishness” (Trusler, 1790, p.29).

spending are strongly tied to the welfare state. Moreover, we lack a systematic explanation that accounts for this variation.

This study proposes a theory for why some individuals and states externalize domestic redistributive values to the foreign policy domain and others do not. The theory focuses on what I call foreign policy orientation, which can be defined as the degree to which individuals agree that their government should primarily be concerned with domestic affairs. My claim is that domestic redistributive values and foreign policy orientation interact to shape foreign aid attitudes and policies. Conservatives, who on average do not support redistribution at home, will also not support redistribution abroad, regardless of their foreign policy orientation. Liberals, however, will be split. Those who want government to have an active foreign policy will support foreign aid. Those who believe government's focus should be at home, will not.

Two possible mechanisms explain the effect of foreign policy orientation on liberals' foreign aid attitudes: ethnocentrism and beliefs about the moral obligation of government. On the one hand, foreign policy orientation may be associated with ethnocentrism (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). This would lead liberal isolationists to oppose foreign aid as they prefer to restrict the use government resources to help their in-group. On the other hand, individuals' foreign policy orientation may simply be a principled stance about whether the obligations of government extend across national borders. While liberals may agree that the government has an obligation to intervene on behalf of the poor domestically, they may differ on whether this obligation to intervene extends to the poor beyond the national border.

I investigate the theory and mechanisms in three unique ways. First, using data from the American National Election Study and an original survey fielded to a nationally representative sample of Americans, I find a strong relationship between social welfare values – operationalized here as placement along the left-right ideological spectrum – and foreign aid attitudes among internationalists. Among isolationists, this association is much weaker or absent altogether. Driving these results is a split among liberals: Liberal internationalists

support foreign aid, while liberal isolationists oppose it. Second, I investigate the mechanism that explains why liberal internationalists are more supportive of foreign aid than liberal isolationists. While there are large differences in beliefs about the government's moral duty to assist those in poverty in other countries between liberal internationalists and isolationists, there are no significant differences between the two in their levels of ethnocentrism. Finally, I examine the generalizability of the U.S. findings in two ways. First, using original data from the United Kingdom and Norway, I investigate the extent to which this theory helps explain variation in support for foreign aid outside of the American context. Second, using a different level of analysis, I examine whether the theory can explain cross-national variation in foreign aid spending. Data from the World Values Survey suggests that understanding how the public weighs the apparent tradeoff between helping the poor at home and helping the poor abroad can explain why some countries have generous welfare states but are foreign aid laggards.

In addition to illuminating the determinants of foreign aid, the work presented here makes three important contributions to international relations scholarship more broadly. First, by specifying the conditions under which individuals externalize domestic redistributive values to the international context, my study contributes to the literature on norm externalization that to this date has focused uniquely on the country level (e.g. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998)). Second, my study advances the literature on foreign policy attitudes, which argues that inconsistency across the domestic and foreign policy domains is a sign that foreign policy attitudes are less stable and structured than domestic policy attitudes (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964). My work suggests that individuals may in fact have principled reasons to support a policy in the domestic context but oppose its foreign policy cognate. Finally, this work encourages future research on foreign policy orientation. Although scholars have been interested in foreign policy orientation since World War II, it has been an inconsistent subject of study. My research indicates however that international relations scholars must

pay attention to foreign policy orientation as it may represent a core value that structures the expression of norms and values learned in the domestic political context in the international domain.

This article proceeds as follows. First, I outline the literature relating ideology, foreign policy orientation, and foreign aid attitudes. Next, I turn to my argument about the interactive effects of ideology and foreign policy orientation on foreign aid preferences and outline the hypotheses. The section that follows describes the data, discusses the findings, and examines their generalizability. Finally, I close with implications for future research.

2 The Ideational Determinants of Foreign Aid

2.1 Social Welfare Values and Foreign Aid

Lumsdaine (1993) is often cited as one of the first scholars to recognize the importance of values related to the welfare state to the development of the foreign aid regime. He argues that the ideational roots of foreign aid can be found in a nation's domestic welfare policies and that citizens' preferences for both domestic aid and foreign aid share a common moral grounding. Since then, numerous scholars have explored the link between values related to domestic redistribution and foreign aid.³ Studies have shown a positive association between welfare state spending and spending on foreign aid at both the country level and at the individual level in terms of spending preferences (Lumsdaine, 1993; Noël and Thérien, 1995, 2002). Researchers have also found evidence that social welfare values as measured by the left-right ideological spectrum can explain variation in public opinion on foreign aid (Paxton and Knack, 2012; Milner and Tingley, 2013*a*), legislative votes on foreign aid (Milner and Tingley, 2010, 2011), and cross-national patterns of foreign aid spending (Tingley, 2010;

³A number of other ideational sources of foreign aid have been proposed, but have been a less consistent focus of the literature, including religiosity (Paxton and Knack, 2012), altruism (Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit, 2014), racial paternalism (Baker, 2015), ethnocentrism (Kinder and Kam, 2009), and belief that global poverty is a moral issue (Van Heerde and Hudson, 2010).

Thérien and Noël, 2000). This research demonstrates that individuals and governments on the left support foreign aid more than those on the right of the ideological spectrum.⁴

Beyond issues of redistribution, domestic political norms are thought to influence international politics in a variety of ways. Constructivist theory provides some insights into how domestic norms like those related to the welfare state come to influence international politics (and vice versa). Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue, “Many international norms began as domestic norms and become international...” (893). While scholars since have investigated this process of norm externalization at the country level, less is known about the individual-level process: how do values learned in the domestic political context come to bear on issues of foreign policy? In terms of foreign aid, scholars have suggested that individuals apply ideological orientations developed in the domestic political context to the international context (Lumsdaine, 1993). An implication of this line of reasoning is that individuals are consistent in their support for redistribution across the domestic and international domains as foreign aid, like welfare, is government intervention into the (international) marketplace (Milner and Tingley, 2013*b*). More generally, scholars have observed that values are transsituational and therefore should structure attitudes across domestic and foreign policy domains alike (Rathbun et al., 2016).

It is possible however, that one’s redistributive values may interact with other orientations in ways not yet theorized in the foreign aid literature nor in the literature on norm externalization. Indeed, for redistributive values, it seems particularly problematic to assume that supporters of domestic redistribution will automatically support international redistribution when we know even within the domestic context that support for the welfare state is often conditional on factors such as shared identity (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser (2004)).

⁴In much of this research, domestic redistributive values are conceptualized as placement along the left-right ideological scale which scholars suggest roughly measures individual preferences for government intervention into the economy for the purposes of income redistribution. Others have used similar measures of domestic welfare values including partisanship as well as actual preferences for specific social welfare programs.

Moreover, individuals may believe governments only have an obligation to those within the national border. Thus, I argue that while government intervention into the marketplace is common to both welfare and foreign aid, support for foreign aid requires an additional input: a general disposition that supports government involvement in world affairs. My claim is that support for the welfare state should matter little to individual support for foreign aid among those who think the government's primary focus should be domestic affairs. The welfare state and foreign aid should only be strongly tied in the presence of an internationalist foreign policy orientation.

This claim builds on prior work that suggests internationalism is an important determinant of foreign aid, but does not specify the conditional relationship between it and domestic welfare values. For example, while Lumsdaine (1993) is primarily credited with articulating the moral vision behind foreign aid and its basis in domestic redistributive values, he also emphasizes the importance of internationalism. In explaining the emergence of the foreign aid regime, he states, "The circumstances that led to the creation of aid programs suggest that their roots lay in the development of the welfare state *and of a broad internationalism*" (31).⁵ Lumsdaine is not alone, however, in suggesting that internationalism may play a role. In her comparative study of the determinants of donor countries' foreign aid policies, Lancaster (2008) argues that, "The major ideas shaping U.S. aid reflect a fundamental tension in U.S. history and society between those whose world views were informed by classical liberalism's preference for limitations on the role of the state in society and those who looked to the state as a major vehicle for redistributive policies at home and, eventually, abroad... Other important ideas shaping aid involved the appropriate role of the United States in the world" (94). Moreover, Lancaster notes that the foreign aid policies of donor countries like the U.S. and Germany have varied as their publics turned inward. For example, she observes that the German public's support for foreign aid declined, as did foreign aid spending, dur-

⁵Emphasis added.

ing the 1990s “undoubtedly reflecting the economic stresses associated with reunification” (185). Although Germany had a relatively generous domestic welfare state, the expression of that generosity abroad was constrained by the public’s relatively more inward-looking world view of the time.⁶ These observations suggest that internationalism may be necessary to explaining variation in public opinion on foreign aid and why some states give more than others.

2.2 Foreign Policy Orientation and Foreign Aid

Foreign policy orientation has a long history of study in American politics. Early scholars of American foreign policy argued that because of low salience and low knowledge of international politics, mass foreign policy attitudes lacked structure and were fundamentally unstable (Almond, 1950; Converse, 1964). Contradicting these arguments, more recent research contends that foreign policy attitudes do have structure and are shaped by deeply held values and dispositions (e.g, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987)). One of the most important dispositions identified in this literature is the public’s foreign policy orientation (Pollins and Schweller, 1999). This research finds that a cleavage exists within the American public between those who want an extroverted foreign policy and those who want the government to focus more on domestic issues. It is this foreign policy orientation of individuals that I argue interacts with their domestic redistributive values to shape public opinion on foreign aid.

Scholars find that much of the variation in foreign policy orientation can be found at the individual level rather than in the aggregate. In his study of isolationism which uses American public opinion data from the last thirty years, Kertzer (2013) notes that “there is over 12 times as much variation in foreign policy mood *within* each wave of the data

⁶Beyond the domain of redistribution, scholars suggest more generally that internationalism matters for the scale and speed with which domestic norms may affect and be affected by international politics. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that, “[a]lthough norms have always been a part of international life, changes in communication and transportation technologies and increasing global interdependence have led to increased connectedness and, in a way, are leading to the homogenization of global norms” (909).

as there are *between* them; there is far more division within the public in 1992, say, than between the public in 1988 and the public in 2002” (231). One of the main individual-level factors examined by scholars to explain variation in foreign policy orientation is ideology. Importantly, previous work finds that foreign policy orientation tends to be *uncorrelated* with ideology or partisanship. Instead, ideology and partisanship seem to shape preferences over *how* the U.S. government engages in foreign policy, such as the desirability of using force, but not *whether* it engages (Wittkopf, 1990; Holsti, 2004; Rathbun, 2007; Milner and Tingley, 2013a). For example, Chaudoin, Milner and Tingley (2010) demonstrate that in over 60 years of public opinion data there are relatively few differences between Democrats and Republicans in their support for an active foreign policy even though in recent years Democrats on average are slightly more isolationist than Republicans.

Scholars have therefore turned to other explanations for variation in foreign policy orientation. One of the key findings is that internationalism tends to be associated with elite-level characteristics. Page and Barabas (2000) devote considerable attention to this point in a study of mass and elite preferences. They find that “[t]he most conspicuous gap between citizens and leaders is a familiar and long-standing one: more leaders than citizens tend to be ‘internationalists,’ at least in the simple sense that they say they favor the United States taking an ‘active part’ in world affairs” (344). However, members of the public that share elite qualities such as higher education, wealth, and political knowledge are also on average more internationalist (Kertzer, 2013).

Isolationists on the other hand are typically characterized by the converse of the elite qualities listed above, having fewer years of education, lower income, and less knowledge about and interest in politics. However, personality traits more specific to isolationists have also been identified including anxiety, aggression, inflexibility, and low self-esteem (McCol-sky, 1967; Sniderman and Citrin, 1971). Those with lower levels of international trust are also thought to be more isolationist (Brewer et al., 2004) as are those with higher levels of

ethnocentrism (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987). Lastly, recent advances in the study of moral psychology have allowed for the identification of the moral values underpinning foreign policy orientations. While internationalists of both the hawk and dove variety seem to draw their foreign policy positions from different moral values, scholars suggest that isolationism is largely amoral or rests on moral foundations such as libertarian values that are different from those that characterize hawks and doves (Kertzer et al., 2014).

Although rarely the main independent variable in models of foreign aid attitudes, scholars have observed that those with a more internationalist orientation tend to support foreign aid at a higher rate than those with a more isolationist orientation (Wittkopf, 1990; Holsti, 2004). Support for foreign aid is sometimes taken as an indicator of support for a cooperative type of internationalism while others have suggested that foreign aid is a flexible policy tool that can be supported by more militant internationalists as well depending on its perceived use (Wittkopf, 1990). Scholars have also examined the relationship between other dispositions that may be closely linked with foreign policy orientation such as cosmopolitanism and foreign aid. Bechtel, Hainmueller and Margalit (2014) find cosmopolitanism to be one of the strongest predictors of German support for international bailouts, a type of foreign aid.

While on average internationalism appears to be positively correlated with support for foreign aid, this relationship is likely to be conditional on individuals' domestic welfare values. Conservative internationalists – individuals who oppose government redistribution in the domestic context but want an extroverted foreign policy – may be only marginally more likely to support foreign redistribution than conservative isolationists. Instead, as previous scholars have noted, those on the right may prefer more militant foreign policy initiatives than more cooperative ones like foreign aid. Thus, among individuals who oppose domestic redistribution, internationalism is likely to have only a small effect, if any, on support for foreign aid. On the other hand, the association between internationalism and support for foreign aid is likely to be strong among liberals who are inclined to support the redistributive

activities of the government. Isolationists may oppose the extension of those activities to the international context, while internationalists might very much favor it. Thus, examining the interaction between foreign policy orientation and domestic redistributive values will likely shed light on the relationship between foreign policy orientation and foreign aid as well.

3 Theoretical Expectations and Hypotheses

My claim is that individuals draw on both their redistributive values and foreign policy orientation when forming their preferences on foreign aid policy. The first hypothesis follows from the literature linking ideology to support for foreign aid. Prior research finds a positive correlation between domestic redistributive values and support for foreign aid. I conceptualize these values as placement on the left-right ideological spectrum and call those on the left, liberals, and those on the right, conservatives.

H1: Liberals will be more supportive of foreign aid than conservatives, all else equal.

The next hypothesis comes from the literature that finds a relationship between foreign policy orientation and support for foreign aid. I call those individuals who desire an extroverted foreign policy, internationalists, and those who want the government to focus on domestic affairs, isolationists.

H2: Internationalists will be more supportive of foreign aid than isolationists, all else equal.

My theory proposes an interaction between these variables. With respect to ideology, it suggests that the relationship between ideology and foreign aid is conditional on foreign policy orientation. Internationalists should be more likely to externalize their domestic redistributive values to the international context, leading to a strong correlation between ideology and foreign aid support. The relationship between ideology and foreign aid among isolationists should be weaker as liberal isolationists will be less likely to externalize their

values than liberal internationalists. In the following hypotheses, higher values of ideology correspond to the liberal end of the spectrum.

H3a: *There will be a large, positive association between ideology and support for foreign aid among internationalists.*

H3b: *There will be a small, positive association between ideology and support for foreign aid among isolationists.*

Similarly, I argue that the relationship between foreign policy orientation and support for foreign aid is conditional on the ideology of individuals. In the following hypotheses, higher values of foreign policy orientation correspond to the internationalist end of the spectrum.

H4a: *There will be a large, positive association between foreign policy orientation and support for foreign aid among liberals.*

H4b: *There will be a small, positive association between foreign policy orientation and support for foreign aid among conservatives.*

These predictions about the conditional relationship between ideology and foreign policy orientation suggest that there is a split between liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists. To understand why liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists have different preferences for foreign aid, I examine the mechanisms behind the effect of foreign policy orientation. I investigate two possibilities. The first mechanism corresponds to the association identified in previous research between foreign policy orientation and ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism according to Kinder and Kam (2009) is a “predisposition to divide human society into in-groups and out-groups” (31). They argue that the national group may be a powerful in-group for some and suggest that those who feel more strongly attached to the national group will oppose policies such as foreign aid, which benefit individuals outside of the national group. In their account of the structure of foreign policy attitudes, Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) suggest that ethnocentrism is associated with isolationism. Ethnocentrism

could therefore lead liberal isolationists to have less support for foreign aid than liberal internationalists, because these two groups differ greatly on the degree to which they consider foreign aid recipients to be members of their in-group. For liberal internationalists, although the foreign poor are not objective members of their national group, research on group membership demonstrates that subjective identification with a group can substitute for objective membership and provide strong incentives for supporting government programs that benefit them (Wong, 2010).

H5: Liberal internationalists will be more likely to identify the foreign poor as members of their in-group than liberal isolationists.

The second relates to the idea that foreign policy orientation captures a core value related to beliefs about the obligations of government. Regardless of whether individuals identify with recipients beyond the national border, they may hold beliefs about the moral obligations of governments purely due to the institutional arrangement of society into a system of sovereign states. By virtue of the social contract between citizens to establish a government, individuals hold beliefs that governments have moral obligations to constituents. These ideals can be libertarian in nature with government having only minimal obligations to citizens, or extend to the most interventionist conceptions of obligation found in social welfare states. Regardless of their extent, what is true for all of these ideals is that the world beyond a state's national borders is not party to this contract between government and citizens and thus is necessarily at a moral disadvantage. Individuals may therefore vary in the extent to which they believe the moral obligation of government extends across national borders. If this mechanism obtains, we should see liberal internationalists agreeing at a higher rate that government has a moral obligation to help the foreign poor than liberal isolationists. In the section that follows, I provide evidence to adjudicate between these two mechanisms.

H6: Liberal internationalists will be more likely to agree that government has a moral obligation to the foreign poor than liberal isolationists.

4 Data and Measurement

I use two primary sources of data to test the theory. The first dataset consists of pooled data from the past twenty years of the American National Election Study (“the ANES surveys”). The data begins in 1990, the first year that all three of the main dependent and independent variables are available. The second source of data is an original survey fielded in July of 2013 to a nationally representative, online sample of 1,000 Americans through the survey firm YouGov (“the YouGov survey”).⁷

The key independent variables in the study are ideology and foreign policy orientation. In the analyses that follow, *Ideology* is operationalized as placement along the left-right ideological scale. In all models, higher values correspond to the liberal end of the distribution. This variable has three categories and is coded 0 for those who identify as conservative, 1 for moderates, and 2 for liberals. Foreign policy orientation is measured in the standard way using a question asking respondents whether the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs or stay out of world affairs. In the analyses that follow, the variable is labeled *Internationalism* and coded 1 if the respondent said the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs and 0 if the respondent said the U.S. should stay out of world affairs. The questions measuring both *Ideology* and *Internationalism* are identically worded in the ANES surveys and YouGov survey.

I find in both the ANES and YouGov surveys that *Ideology* and *Internationalism* are relatively orthogonal. In the ANES surveys, 78% of liberals and 81% of conservatives say they are internationalists. In the YouGov survey, conservatives are slightly more isolationist (53%) than they are internationalist (47%), while liberals seem to skew slightly to the internationalist side of the spectrum with 58% saying the U.S. should take an active role in world affairs and 42% saying the U.S. should stay out. Additionally, comparing the ANES

⁷The survey questions were included as a part of the Stanford Laboratory of American Values omnibus instrument.

data and the YouGov data we can see that isolationism is much higher in the more recent YouGov survey. I suggest this may be due to the 2008 financial crisis and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Given the different time periods, showing that my findings hold across the ANES and YouGov surveys is an important endeavor.

Turing to the dependent variables, the question measuring foreign aid attitudes in the ANES surveys simply asks respondents if they would like to increase, decrease, or keep the same the amount of money the U.S. government spends on foreign aid. I code the dependent variable 0 if the respondent wants to decrease foreign aid and 1 if they want to expand or keep it the same. Around half the respondents (51%) want to decrease foreign aid, while the other half want to maintain or expand it.

The second dependent variable comes from a vignette in the form of a news article embedded in the YouGov survey, which was shown to a random subset of the sample (around 500 respondents).⁸ Because individuals often are misinformed about foreign aid, the news article aimed to give individuals basic information about the aid program before asking respondents to offer their support or opposition. The news article featured a hypothetical foreign aid program that U.S. officials might cut. The program was described as a hunger relief program that helps 150,000 people. Respondents were also told that the program costs 100 million dollars⁹ and that officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.¹⁰ After reading the news article, respondents were then asked whether they thought government officials should cut or should not cut the program. In all models, the dependent variable is coded as 1 if respondents said the officials “Should not cut the program” and

⁸The vignette can be found in the Appendix.

⁹Pretests using Amazon Mechanical Turk that asked respondents to describe why they supported or opposed a program revealed that the cost was seldom the reason for their decision. When cost was mentioned, there was substantial variation ranging from the amount is too high to the amount is too low.

¹⁰Two factors are also randomized within the vignette. The first is the race of recipients and the second is the modality of the assistance (in kind or cash transfers). This leads to a 2x2 factorial design. I include binary indicators for the two treatments in all models. In related work, I investigate the importance of the two experimental factors to support for foreign aid.

0 if they said officials “Should cut the program”.¹¹ Around 58% of respondents said they thought the government should cut the program, while around 42% said they thought the government should not cut the program.

5 Findings and Discussion

5.1 ANES 1990-2008

I begin by analyzing the data from the American National Election Study. The ANES regularly surveys large, nationally representative samples of the American public on an assortment of political issues. Beginning in 1990, researchers started regularly including a question on foreign aid spending. For simplicity, I pool the data from surveys fielded between 1990 and 2008 and control for the survey year.¹² Again, it is important to emphasize that the dependent variable is significantly more general in the ANES as the question simply asks individuals about foreign aid broadly conceived. This is then a hard test for the theory as it is possible that ideology has a different relationship with certain kinds of foreign aid such as military aid. Thus, my findings depend somewhat on whether or not individuals think of foreign economic aid, the type of aid more closely resembling income redistribution, when they are asked about foreign aid in general.

I use probit regressions to test the hypotheses generated from the theory. The dependent variable, *Aid Support*, is regressed on *Ideology*, *Internationalism*, and an interaction term *Ideology*Internationalism*. In the full models, I employ a number of control variables as well. These include standard individual-level characteristics such as age, gender, race, education, and work status, as well as respondents’ assessment of the state of the national economy.

¹¹Descriptive statistics for the main independent and dependent variables can be found in Table 8 in the Appendix.

¹²Results based on each survey year are available from the author, but not reported here. In every year included in the dataset, except for 1996, the results are quite similar. It is unclear why the results are different for 1996, though this was the year the U.S. government debated and passed welfare reform.

Previous research suggests that foreign policy orientation may be associated with subjective assessments of the state of the economy (Kertzer, 2013) and these subjective assessments may also be associated with support for foreign aid, particularly if respondents believe the U.S. cannot afford to spend money on overseas programs. Thus, I control for these subjective assessments in order to eliminate bias associated with any short-term judgments about how well the U.S. economy is doing.

The coefficients from the probit regression models can be found in Table 1. My first hypothesis predicts that *Ideology* will be positively associated with support for foreign aid (recall that higher values of *Ideology* correspond to the liberal end of the ideological spectrum) and the second hypothesis predicts that *Internationalism* will be positively associated with support for foreign aid. Model 1 holds the coefficients from the probit model of *Aid Support* without the interaction term and control variables, while Model 2 examines the robustness of the effects to the inclusion of the control variables. Model 3 adds the interaction term.

As can be seen in Models 1 and 2, *Ideology* and *Internationalism* are both significant predictors of support for foreign aid, the relationships are in the expected direction (positive associations for both), and are robust to the inclusion of the control variables. Turning to the core hypotheses of the theory, one can see in Model 3 that the coefficient on the interaction term between *Ideology* and *Internationalism* is statistically significant suggesting that ideology and foreign policy orientation interact to shape foreign aid attitudes. Because the coefficients from interaction models (and probit models) are difficult to interpret, I estimate the marginal effects of *Ideology* and *Internationalism* on the predicted probability of supporting foreign aid from the interaction model. These probabilities are displayed graphically in Figure 1.

The findings reveal that among isolationists, there is no relationship between ideology and foreign aid. Isolationist liberals are no more supportive of foreign aid than isolationist conservatives. The expected positive association is found among internationalists. Liberal

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Ideology	0.17*** (0.021)	0.15*** (0.021)	0.02 (0.048)
Internationalism	0.54*** (0.042)	0.57*** (0.043)	0.43*** (0.063)
Ideology*Internationalism			0.16*** (0.053)
Education		-0.01 (0.021)	-0.01 (0.021)
Woman		0.14*** (0.035)	0.14*** (0.035)
Age		-0.00 (0.001)	-0.00 (0.001)
White		-0.30*** (0.041)	-0.31*** (0.041)
Employed		-0.13*** (0.042)	-0.13*** (0.042)
National Economy		0.11*** (0.029)	0.12*** (0.029)
Constant	-0.91*** (0.065)	-0.64*** (0.107)	-0.52*** (0.113)
Observations	5,699	5,570	5,570
Pseudo R2	0.05	0.06	0.06
Log likelihood	-3765.26	-3631.49	-3627.19

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents want to expand or keep the same foreign aid spending and coded 0 if respondents want to cut it. Higher values of ideology correspond to the liberal end of the spectrum. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 1: **Predictors of Foreign Aid Support in ANES**

internationalists are significantly more likely to support foreign aid than conservative internationalists. The difference in the predicted probability of supporting foreign aid is a little over 0.10. Taken together, these findings support hypotheses H3a and H3b.




Figure 1: **Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Aid Support by Values and Internationalism, ANES**

Turning to foreign policy orientation, I also find support for hypotheses H4a and H4b. The strongest association between foreign policy orientation and support for foreign aid is among liberals (H4a), while the effect of foreign policy orientation is weaker among conservatives (H4b). The magnitude of the effect among conservatives is somewhat surprising even if it is less than the magnitude of the effect among liberals. These findings suggest that for general questions about foreign aid, conservative internationalists may be significantly more likely to support foreign aid than conservative isolationists as the term “foreign aid” may encompass a broader range of policies, such as military aid, that conservative internationalists might be willing to support.

This analysis provides support for the theory and demonstrates its significance across more than two decades of American public opinion. Moreover, the findings show that how we formulate questions about foreign aid may impact the relationships we find in the data. The broader question about foreign aid seems to allow greater support from conservative internationalists than might more narrow questions about specific types of foreign aid such as

humanitarian aid. The strength of the association between ideology and foreign aid attitudes among internationalists and isolationists is also somewhat weaker than expected, though measurement error due to the question wording may be responsible for it. Nevertheless, given that this dependent variable made for a hard test of the hypotheses, the results provide support for the theory and imply that it is applicable beyond the current time period.

5.2 YouGov Results

The rest of the analyses in this section focus on the YouGov survey. I begin by testing the hypotheses related to foreign aid that were confirmed using the ANES data. Following this discussion, I examine the mechanism leading liberal internationalists to greater support for foreign aid than liberal isolationists. Then, I analyze the generalizability of these findings to other countries and levels of analysis.

First, I show that the findings from the ANES data replicate and are even stronger in the YouGov survey. The coefficients from the probit regression models of *Aid Support* can be found in Table 2. Model 1 holds the results from the probit model of *Aid Support* without the interaction term and control variables. The findings from these models confirm that both *Ideology* and *Internationalism* are strong predictors of support for foreign aid (H1 and H2) and that the relationships are robust to the inclusion of control variables (Model 2).

Having confirmed the first two hypotheses, I now turn to the hypotheses about the interaction between ideology and foreign policy orientation. Again, the theory predicts that there will be a weak, positive association between *Ideology* and *Aid Support* among isolationists and a large, positive association between *Ideology* and *Aid Support* among internationalists. I test these hypotheses by adding an interaction term between *Ideology* and *Internationalism* to the previous models. Model 3 in Table 2 holds the coefficients from the interactive model.

I estimate the marginal effect of each ideological category on the predicted probability of support for foreign aid for isolationists and internationalists. These marginal effects are

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Ideology	0.57*** (0.083)	0.45*** (0.090)	0.27** (0.119)
Internationalism	0.39*** (0.125)	0.40*** (0.130)	0.11 (0.187)
Ideology*Internationalism			0.33** (0.163)
Education		0.03 (0.067)	0.02 (0.068)
Woman		0.03 (0.131)	0.03 (0.131)
Age		-0.01** (0.004)	-0.01** (0.004)
White		-0.50*** (0.149)	-0.50*** (0.150)
Employed		-0.15 (0.142)	-0.15 (0.143)
National Economy		0.24** (0.092)	0.23** (0.092)
Constant	-0.71*** (0.240)	-0.04 (0.373)	0.10 (0.381)
Observations	469	469	469
Pseudo R2	0.13	0.18	0.18
Log likelihood	-278.05	-262.52	-260.35

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. Higher values of ideology correspond to the liberal end of the spectrum. The YouGov models also include binary indicators for two other independently-randomized treatments. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 2: **Predictors of Foreign Aid Support in YouGov 2013**

contained in Figure 2. The figure clearly provides evidence in favor of both hypotheses H3 and H4. There is a strong association between ideology and support for foreign aid among




Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Aid Support by Values and Internationalism, YouGov

internationalists, while this association is much weaker among isolationists. The difference in probability of supporting foreign aid between liberal internationalists and conservative internationalists is 0.43, while this difference is considerably smaller between liberal and conservative isolationists at only 0.19.

To examine the effect of foreign policy orientation across the ideological spectrum, we can also use this figure. The theory predicts a weak, positive association between foreign policy orientation and support for foreign aid among conservatives, but a large, positive correlation among liberals. The findings confirm these predictions as well. *Internationalism* only has a small, and insignificant positive association with support for foreign aid among conservatives – a change in predicted probability of only 0.04. The effect among liberals on the other hand is dramatic. The change in predicted probability between liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists is five times as large at 0.22, with liberal internationalists much more likely to support foreign aid than liberal isolationists. These findings provide strong evidence in favor of the theory presented here and confirm the hypotheses derived from it.

5.3 Mechanisms

The question remains as to what is driving the effect of foreign policy orientation on support for foreign aid among liberals. Is it the case that foreign policy orientation reflects a core value related to beliefs about the obligation of government (H5), or does it capture the extent to which individuals have an ethnocentric orientation towards members of their national group and away from those beyond their nation's borders (H6)? To adjudicate between these mechanisms, I use two questions that follow the news article vignette. The first question asks respondents whether they agree (1) or disagree (0) that they have ideas and interests in common with the recipients of the foreign aid program (*In-Group*).¹³ A more general version of this latter question has appeared in previous work on social identity theory and has been used by scholars to measure the social groups with which individuals identify (Wong, 2010). The second question asks respondents whether they agree (1) or disagree (0) with the statement that the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the recipients of the foreign aid program (*Obligation*).

In a sample from the YouGov survey that is restricted to liberals, I use probit regressions to estimate the effect of foreign policy orientation on *In-Group* and *Obligation*. These models can be found in Table 3. For ease of interpretability, I estimate the predicted probabilities from Model 2 of each dependent variable and display them in Figure 3 below. In the case of *In-Group*, foreign policy orientation has a positive effect on whether individuals identify the foreign aid recipients as part of their in-group, but this effect is not significant at traditional levels. The substantive size of the effect is also relatively small. The predicted probability that liberal internationalists view foreign aid recipients as a part of their in-group is only 0.12 greater than liberal isolationists. These findings do not support H5 and suggest that ethnocentrism is an unlikely mechanism driving the effect of foreign policy orientation on

¹³In the Appendix, I also show that liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists have similar levels of ethnocentrism as measured in the standard way in the literature (Kinder and Kam, 2009).

foreign aid support.

	In-Group 1	In-Group 2	Obligation 1	Obligation 2
Internationalism	0.36 (0.243)	0.32 (0.257)	1.21*** (0.275)	1.23*** (0.288)
Education		0.25* (0.130)		0.35** (0.158)
Woman		0.07 (0.243)		0.01 (0.312)
Age		-0.01 (0.008)		-0.01 (0.009)
White		-0.25 (0.286)		-0.16 (0.378)
Employed		-0.10 (0.265)		-0.07 (0.318)
National Economy		0.02 (0.176)		0.01 (0.193)
Constant	-0.24 (0.335)	-0.46 (0.594)	0.09 (0.359)	-0.22 (0.707)
Observations	122	122	122	122
Pseudo R2	0.02	0.05	0.17	0.23
Log likelihood	-82.37	-79.92	-53.50	-49.90

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit coefficient estimates. The sample size is limited to liberals in the foreign aid treatment condition. The dependent variable, In-Group, is coded 1 if the respondent views the foreign aid recipients as part of her in-group and 0 if she does not. The dependent variable, Obligation, is coded 1 if the respondent believes the U.S. government has a moral obligation to help the foreign aid recipients and 0 if she does not. All models include binary indicators for two other independently-randomized treatments. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 3: **Mechanisms Behind Foreign Policy Orientation’s Effect on Liberals**

Instead, the data suggest that the more likely story is that foreign policy orientation captures a fundamental belief about the moral duties of government. The relationship between foreign policy orientation and beliefs about the obligation of the U.S. government to foreign aid recipients is strong and significant. The model predicts that liberal internationalists are extremely likely to agree that the U.S. government has a moral duty to help the recipients




Figure 3: **Mechanisms Behind Foreign Policy Orientation's Effect on Liberals**

of the foreign aid program. Their predicted probability is 0.90. On the other hand, liberal isolationists only agree around half of the time, with a predicted probability of only 0.57. It is evident that the effect of foreign policy orientation on liberal beliefs about the moral obligation of the government is quite large resulting in a change of probability between the two liberal camps of 0.33.

Now, recall that liberal internationalists are much more likely to support foreign aid than liberal isolationists. Again, the difference in probability of supporting foreign aid between the two groups is around 0.22. What proportion of this difference is due to their diverging views about the moral obligation of the government? To answer this question, we can use causal mediation techniques such as those developed by Imai et al. (2011) and Tomz and Weeks (2013). I use the algorithm detailed in Imai, Keele and Tingley (2010) to estimate the average causal mediated effect or ACME. I divide the ACME by the total effect (0.22) to get the proportion. The algorithm is outlined below.

1. Model *Aid Support* and *Obligation* letting Y_i be *Aid Support*, T_i be *Internationalism*, M_i be the mediator of interest, *Obligation*, and X_i be a vector of the control variables.

- *Obligation* model: $p(M_i | T_i, X_i)$
 - *Aid Support* model: $p(Y_i | T_i, M_i, X_i)$
 - Use any model form to estimate. In this paper, all models are probit regressions.
2. Predict *Obligation* for both internationalists and isolationists ($M_i(1), M_i(0)$)
 3. Predict *Aid Support* by first setting $T_i = 1$ (internationalist) and $M_i = M_i(0)$, and then $T_i = 0$ (isolationist) and $M_i = M_i(1)$
 4. Compute the average difference between the two outcomes to obtain the estimate of the ACME.
 5. Use Monte-Carlo simulations to estimate uncertainty.

We can use the model of *Obligation* from Table 3 to obtain the predicted values of *Obligation* for both liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists (step 2 above). These are the predicted probabilities located in Figure 3. What remains, then, is to estimate *Aid Support* as a function of both foreign policy orientation and beliefs about the obligation of government (step 3 above). Table 4 holds the probit regression coefficients from the model. Model 1 displays the simple bivariate relationship between *Internationalism* and *Aid Support*. The coefficient on *Internationalism* confirms that it is a significant predictor of support for foreign aid among liberals. Model 2 however demonstrates that the effect of *Internationalism* disappears completely when we add *Obligation*. This indicates that a significant proportion of the effect of foreign policy orientation is likely due to beliefs about the government's obligations abroad. Model 3 shows that the effects of *Obligation* are robust to the inclusion of the control variables.

Using these equations, I can now estimate the ACME. The causal mediation analysis shows that the size of the effect of foreign policy orientation that goes through beliefs about the moral obligation of the government is a change in probability of supporting the aid program of 0.17. Comparing this to the total effect size of 0.22, I discover that 77 percent of the total effect of foreign policy orientation on liberal support for foreign aid goes through beliefs about the government's moral obligation to help recipients. These findings demonstrate that

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Internationalism	0.74*** (0.258)	0.09 (0.304)	-0.00 (0.315)
Obligation		1.95*** (0.371)	2.03** (0.383)
Constant	0.93*** (0.358)	0.23 (0.393)	-0.66 (0.725)
Controls	No	No	Yes
Observations	122	122	122
Pseudo R2	0.10	0.33	0.36

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. All of the models include binary indicators for two other independently-randomized treatments and religiosity to correct for treatment imbalance. The model with complete control variables includes measures of education, gender, age, race, employment, and views on the national economy. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 4: **Obligation as Predictor of Liberal Foreign Aid Support**

liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists differ considerably on whether they believe the government has a moral duty to help the foreign poor and that this difference explains why liberal isolationists are less supportive of foreign aid than liberal internationalists.

Taken together, I find substantial evidence that ideology and foreign policy orientation interact to shape foreign aid attitudes. This conditional relationship is identified in the ANES using data from 1990-2008 and in an original survey fielded in 2013. I further show that foreign policy orientation affects the relationship between ideology and foreign aid attitudes by constraining liberal isolationists who do not externalize their support for domestic redistribution to the international context. I demonstrate that this is primarily due to a dif-

ference in beliefs about whether the obligations of government extend across national borders rather than a difference in the degree to which liberal internationalists and liberal isolationists identify with foreign recipients. Instead, liberal internationalists appear to believe the moral obligation of government extends across the national border, while liberal isolationists tend to believe the moral duties of government stop at the water's edge.

These results provide insight into why American support for foreign aid is so low. Indeed, it is well known that Americans are quick to want to cut foreign aid and it is often the first policy on the chopping block when Americans are asked to eliminate a program. While past research would suggest that this is because Americans generally do not favor policies that include a redistributive element, I show that in fact the base of support for foreign aid in the U.S. is even weaker. Even those who are favorable towards redistribution may not extend this support to foreign aid. Thus, American support for foreign aid continues to be dramatically low because liberals, who should be the base of support for redistribution, are divided by their foreign policy orientation.

6 Generalizability

Two limitations to the above analyses are that the hypotheses are only tested using American public opinion and they do not test whether the theory helps explain variation in foreign aid *policy*. Thus, in this section, I examine the generalizability of the findings in two ways. First, while there is no theoretical expectation that the theory should vary across countries, I use data from the UK and Norway – two substantially important donor countries – to confirm the theory there. Second, I provide suggestive evidence below that understanding how individuals weigh the tradeoff between helping the domestic poor and foreign poor, can also explain variation in cross-national spending on foreign aid.

6.1 Public Opinion in Other Donor Countries

I collect data from two additional donor countries – the United Kingdom and Norway – using original surveys fielded in 2014. Although these cases were chosen partially for practical reasons and data availability, they are also important foreign aid donors. In 2013, the UK was second only to the United States in its spending on official development assistance. When one weights these spending figures by GNI, however, it is Norway, and not the U.S. or UK, which appears the most generous. Thus, if we want to understand public opinion in countries important to the global foreign aid regime, these are two of the other leading foreign aid donors.

The UK data was collected in a panel survey fielded in March and April of 2014 using the survey firm Survey Sampling International. The sample was recruited online and represents a diverse, national sample of the British population. Around 1200 respondents completed both waves of the panel. Like in the U.S. study, participants read a short fictional newspaper article about a British government assistance program. Whether that assistance program was described as helping the domestic or international poor was randomly assigned to participants in the first wave of the panel. Six weeks later, the respondents were reinterviewed and the treatment was reversed. In other words, a respondent who read about a domestic assistance program in the first wave, read about a foreign assistance program in wave two.

Like the U.S. news article, the UK article held three key details of the program constant across treatment groups. First, the British government was described as debating whether or not to cut the assistance program. Second, the program was described as helping around 150,000 people living below the poverty line. Finally, respondents were told that it cost the British government 100 million pounds each year.¹⁴

¹⁴Two additional experiments were also embedded in the vignette, though the results are not discussed in this paper. The first experiment manipulated the race of the recipients using a photo that primed individuals to think the recipients were either of a white racial background or a black racial background. The second experiment manipulated whether the aid was delivered to recipients in the form of cash or food packages. These treatments are controlled for in all models.

The dependent variable – whether or not the respondent believes the government should cut or should not cut the aid program – is the same as in the U.S. study (called *Aid Support*). Around 68% of respondents said they wanted to cut the program, while only 32% of the respondents said they wanted to keep the program. The British respondents are about ten percentage points less supportive of foreign aid than the U.S. respondents and significantly less supportive than the Norwegian respondents as we will see.

The key independent variables vary slightly from the U.S. models. First, *Ideology* is measured using a question taken from the British Election Study. This question asks respondents to place themselves on a ten-point scale where “right” is defined as one end of the scale and “left” is defined as the other end. Second, *Internationalism* is measured using a question that asks respondents about British intervention in international politics, but in a more narrow way than the U.S. study. The question asked respondents the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the statement “The UK needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world”. I code those who “agree strongly” or “agree somewhat” with the statement as 1 and those who disagree or are uncertain as 0. Although this question may introduce some measurement error into my analysis, it is the best available in the survey. Third, I control for the same demographic factors of respondents as well, except for one. The UK survey does not have a measure of respondents’ perceptions of the national economy. Instead, I use a more narrow question that measures respondents’ perceptions of the effects of foreign aid on the national economy.¹⁵

Figure 4 holds the marginal effects of *Ideology* and *Internationalism* on the predicted probability of supporting the aid program (from Table 5). These are derived from a model that regresses *Aid Support* on the control variables and the interaction between *Internationalism* and *Ideology*. The pattern is nearly identical to that observed in the U.S. At the

¹⁵The question asked respondents the extent to which they believed the UK economy would benefit from the foreign aid program described in the vignette.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Ideology	0.13*** (0.020)	0.11*** (0.022)	0.07** (0.034)
Internationalism	0.54*** (0.080)	0.35*** (0.087)	-0.02 (0.245)
Ideology*Internationalism			0.07* (0.045)
Education		-0.02** (0.010)	-0.03** (0.010)
Woman		0.08 (0.088)	0.07 (0.088)
Age		-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)
White		-0.48*** (0.142)	-0.48*** (0.142)
Employed		-0.08 (0.099)	-0.08 (0.099)
National Interests		0.82*** (0.064)	0.83*** (0.064)
Constant	-1.43*** (0.131)	-1.25*** (0.241)	-1.02*** (0.278)
Observations	1,169	1,169	1,169
Pseudo R2	0.06	0.23	0.23
Log likelihood	-684.72	-562.03	-560.40

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. Higher values of ideology correspond to the liberal end of the spectrum. The models also include binary indicators for two other independently-randomized treatments. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 5: **Predictors of Foreign Aid Support in UK 2014**

conservative end of the distribution of *Ideology*, *Internationalism* has little effect on support for foreign aid. Both conservative isolationists and conservative internationalists are similarly opposed to the foreign aid program. It is not until we reach the middle of the ideological

scale that we start to see a separation between isolationists and internationalists. At the liberal end of the scale, a wide gap opens up. The difference in the probability of supporting the aid program between liberal isolationists and liberal internationalists is around 0.20, or almost the identical results as were obtained in the U.S. survey fielded in 2013.




Figure 4: **Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Aid Support by Values and Internationalism, UK 2014**

A unique feature of the UK data that allows for an additional and compelling test of the theory is its panel design. As noted above, British respondents answered questions on both the foreign aid program and the domestic aid program separated by a period of about six weeks. Thus, I can use respondents' preferences for the domestic aid program to predict their preferences for the *exact* same program that helps foreign recipients. Figure 5 holds the predicted probabilities from this model (from Table 6, where support for the domestic aid program replaces *Ideology* in the model). The figure demonstrates that individuals who said the British government should cut the domestic aid program also said they should cut the foreign aid program regardless of their foreign policy orientation. Among those who stated that the government should not cut the domestic aid program, however, there is a significant




Figure 5: **Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Aid Support by Domestic Aid Support and Internationalism, UK 2014**

difference between internationalists and isolationists. The probability of wanting to keep the foreign aid program is around 0.11 higher among internationalists than isolationists.

Turning to Norwegian public opinion, I fielded an original survey as a part of the Norwegian Citizen Panel in October and November of 2014. The Citizen Panel recruits a large cross-section of Norwegians to participate in web-based surveys. To date, the panel has recruited around 8,500 respondents. My questions were a part of an omnibus instrument administered to the panel and were asked to a random subset of around 850 panelists. These questions included measures of attitudes towards foreign aid, internationalism, and ideology, along with measures for many of the control variables described above.

The dependent variable is a question that asks respondents to assess whether the Norwegian government should increase, decrease, or maintain the present level of government spending on foreign aid. I create two different dependent variables from these responses. The first variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if the respondent said maintain or increase foreign aid spending and coded 0 if the respondent said to cut spending on foreign aid. This

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Domestic Aid	0.78*** (0.091)	0.78*** (0.107)	0.59*** (0.145)
Internationalism	0.50*** (0.080)	0.31*** (0.088)	0.03 (0.177)
Domestic Aid*Internationalism			0.38* (0.203)
Education		-0.03*** (0.010)	-0.03*** (0.010)
Woman		0.05 (0.090)	0.05 (0.090)
Age		-0.01*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)
White		-0.54*** (0.146)	-0.54*** (0.146)
Employed		-0.03 (0.102)	-0.02 (0.102)
National Interests		0.82*** (0.068)	0.83*** (0.067)
Constant	-1.35*** (0.113)	-1.21*** (0.241)	-1.08*** (0.250)
Observations	1,169	1,169	1,169
Pseudo R2	0.08	0.25	0.26
Log likelihood	-669.44	-544.82	-543.01

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit coefficient estimates. The dependent variable is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said officials should not cut the aid program and coded 0 if respondents said officials should cut the aid program. Higher values of ideology correspond to the liberal end of the spectrum. The models also include binary indicators for two other independently-randomized treatments. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 6: **Domestic Aid and Foreign Aid Support in UK 2014**

variable most closely mirrors the dependent variable from the UK and U.S. surveys. The distribution of this variable demonstrates that Norwegians are significantly more supportive of foreign aid than either the American or British respondents. 77% of Norwegian respon-

dents said they wanted the government to increase or maintain current spending levels on foreign aid compared to only 23% who said they wanted to cut it. Because Norwegians are significantly more supportive of foreign aid than either the UK and U.S. respondents, I also use a trichotomous variable with three categories for decrease, maintain, and increase, in order to explore the upper range of the distribution.

The measures of *Internationalism* and *Ideology* are more similar to what has been used in the U.S. and UK surveys. First, the question that measures *Internationalism* mirrors exactly that used in the U.S. surveys. Respondents were asked whether they think it is best for the future of Norway if Norway plays an active role in international politics (coded 1) or takes a more reduced role (coded 0). Second, the measure of *Ideology* is the same as that used in the UK survey. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-point scale where one end of the scale corresponded to “left” and the other end of the scale corresponded to “right”. Although these independent variables are similar to what was used in the previous studies, the control variables vary somewhat. I measure respondents education, gender, age, employment status, and their perception of the national economy. The survey, however, lacks a measure of respondents’ racial background, which is not common on surveys in Norway and thus is not included on the instrument fielded to the Citizen Panel. I considered using a measure of respondents’ immigration history, however, that question was not asked to a third of the sample. Thus, I opt to simply not include a measure of racial background in the Norwegian models.

Figure 6 holds the predicted probabilities from probit regression models of the binary indicator for foreign aid support that includes the interaction between *Ideology* and *Internationalism* (from Table 9 in the Appendix). There are two key elements of this figure of importance to this study. The first is that the relationship between ideology and support for foreign aid among internationalists is difficult to discern in its entirety. This is because the liberal end of the ideological spectrum is characterized by almost unanimous support in favor

of maintaining or increasing foreign aid spending. In other words, there is a ceiling effect that appears to constrain what would otherwise be an even stronger correlation between ideology and support for foreign aid among internationalists. It also makes the interactive hypothesis difficult to confirm. This is the second issue of importance. Although, this figure is suggestive of an interaction as there is a slightly weaker correlation between ideology and support for foreign aid among isolationists. The relationship between internationalism and ideology appears to be more additive than interactive.




Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Foreign Aid Support (Maintain and Increase) by Values and Internationalism, Norway 2014

To examine whether it may be easier to observe the interaction at the upper end of support for foreign aid, I employ an ordered probit model and use the trichotomous measure of foreign aid support. Figure 7 holds the predicted probability that a respondent wants to *increase* foreign aid (not just maintain it) based on the ordered probit model. Here the expected pattern is much more apparent. There is a strong, positive association between ideology and support for increasing foreign aid among internationalists, while the relationship is much weaker for isolationists. Moreover, there is almost no difference among conservatives

in their opposition to increasing foreign aid. Among liberals, however, a wide gap opens up with liberal internationalists significantly more likely to want to increase foreign aid than isolationists. The difference is substantively quite large with the probability of wanting to increase foreign aid among the most liberal internationalists at 0.58 and the same probability among the most liberal isolationists at only 0.22.




Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Support for Increased Foreign Aid by Values and Internationalism, Norway 2014

The findings from the UK and Norway provide evidence that theory developed in this article applies to other important donor countries. Like in the United States, there is a significant interaction between ideology and foreign policy orientation that shapes British attitudes towards foreign aid. Given Britain’s turn towards isolationism and the rise of isolationist parties like the United Kingdom Independence Party, these findings provide a window into the potential future of British foreign aid. The findings from Norway also demonstrate that theory helps explain attitudes in other countries. Although the relationship between ideology, foreign policy orientation, and foreign aid appeared more additive than interactive at first glance, this result seems to be more an artifact of the high levels of

support for foreign aid there. Where the theory really seems to take hold is in explaining who in Norway wants to see foreign aid increased. Although not quite as isolationist yet as other European countries, Norway too has had its share of issues surrounding redistribution and foreigners. These issues have tended to be related to the domestic welfare state and immigration, but could easily extend to foreign aid.

6.2 Cross-National Variation in Foreign Aid Spending

What are the implications of the individual-level findings for cross-national variation in foreign aid spending? Can the theory developed here help us understand why some countries are generous at home but more stingy abroad and others are generous in both contexts? The ideal test of the theory would be to interact countries' aggregate level of internationalism with their domestic welfare spending. I would expect that in countries with high levels of internationalism, welfare spending would be strongly correlated with foreign aid spending, but for countries with low levels of internationalism, this relationship would be significantly attenuated. Unfortunately, a survey measure of public internationalism does not exist for most countries, thus I turn to a rough approximation that captures the tradeoff between helping the poor at home and helping the poor abroad.

This question was included on Wave 5 of the World Values survey. It asks respondents to place themselves on a scale numbered 1 to 10, where 1 corresponds to the idea that the country's leaders should give top priority to reducing poverty in the world and 10 corresponds to the idea that the country's leaders should give top priority to solving the country's own problems. The measure is available for 11 foreign aid donor countries surveyed between 2005 and 2009.

Table 7 shows the mean placement on this scale for the 11 countries. As one might expect, Norway and Sweden rank near the top, with the mean placement of their publics being nearest the middle of the scale. This suggests that in these countries, the public likely

Country	Mean
Norway	5.9
Sweden	6.03
Spain	6.46
Switzerland	6.82
Finland	7.01
Australia	7.28
Japan	7.4
Canada	7.46
Germany	7.54
United States	7.87
Slovenia	8.67

Table 7: **Prioritizing Global Poverty**

wants their leaders to place a top priority on both fighting global poverty and on addressing problems at home. On the opposite end of the scale we have countries like Germany and the United States whose publics prefer for their leaders to focus on problems at home over global poverty.




Figure 8: **Prioritizing Global Poverty and Foreign Aid Spending**

Using this question, we can examine whether understanding the public's domestic-foreign

tradeoff has a relationship with foreign aid spending as my theory would predict. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 8, this measure is a strong predictor of foreign aid spending. Norwegians and Swedes are the most likely to place equal priority on fighting poverty abroad and addressing problems at home and these countries are also the most generous in terms of foreign aid. Countries like Germany, Slovenia, and Finland, who have similar levels of domestic social spending to Norway and Sweden, are more likely to prioritize domestic affairs relative to global poverty and thus are less generous in terms of their foreign aid spending. These results suggest that the theory presented here may be a better model of cross-national variation in foreign aid spending than the current theories focusing on the welfare state alone. My theory better accounts for why some countries have generous welfare states, but do not externalize this generosity to the international context.

7 Conclusion

The theory and evidence in this article provide new insights into the relationship between social welfare values and foreign aid. The review of the literature suggests that social welfare values are associated with support for foreign aid. Yet, I argue that for some individuals these values may stop at the water's edge. My theory proposes that support for foreign aid also requires that individuals want their government to be actively involved in world affairs, otherwise their support for government intervention in the domestic economy does not translate to the international marketplace. Using data from the U.S., UK, and Norway, I confirm the hypotheses drawn from the theory demonstrating the conditional relationship between values and foreign policy orientation and showing how they work together to shape foreign aid attitudes. Moreover, I show that foreign policy orientation conditions liberal support for foreign aid not due to an underlying difference in ethnocentrism between liberal isolationists and internationalists, but rather due to principled beliefs about the moral obligations of

government.

These findings have a number of implications for foreign aid and international relations more generally. First, I provide suggestive evidence that the theory developed here can help explain not just public attitudes towards foreign aid, but cross-national patterns of foreign aid spending as well. This may obtain because most foreign aid donor countries are democracies and their policies reflect in some part public preferences (Baum and Potter, 2015). Or it may be that the distribution of preferences among the public is similar to those of policymakers. Future work could build on this research by examining the interaction between social welfare values and isolationism among policymakers. Whichever of these mechanisms obtains, the implications for the politics of foreign aid remain clear. While the existing literature would suggest that a decrease in support for domestic redistribution is the most likely factor to produce a decrease in foreign aid spending, my work suggests that an increase in isolationism could have a similar effect. For example, it is now apparent that the refugee crisis in Europe may increase isolationism in many European countries. This may then lead to a decrease in spending on foreign aid even though it is unlikely that domestic welfare budgets would decrease.

Second, beyond foreign aid, this work has implications for explaining variation in foreign policy preferences more generally. Given that core values and beliefs are learned in a social context (Feldman, 1988), and the most immediate contexts for individuals are the interpersonal and domestic domains, then we might expect this theory to be applicable to a wider set of foreign policy issues. That is to say, foreign policy orientation may govern the expression of other domestic political values in the international context. For example, Liberman (2006) examines the role of retributive values in shaping support for war. He argues that a proxy for these values in the domestic context is support for the death penalty. Following a similar logic to that of the relationship between domestic and foreign redistribution, he proposes that beliefs about government punishment in the domestic context will be associated

with beliefs about government punishment abroad. Does foreign policy orientation govern the extent to which these retributive beliefs come to bear on support for war? Future work could test the theory on a wide range of domestic and foreign policy cognates, pushing the research agenda on norm externalization at the individual level even further.

Third, this study has implications for theories about the structure of foreign policy attitudes. As previously noted, one of the early observations in the literature on foreign policy preferences was that foreign aid attitudes lack structure and a sign of this was that there appeared to be inconsistencies across the domestic and foreign policy contexts in individual attitudes. My work suggests that this inconsistency could yet be structured by an individual's foreign policy orientation. Rather than a signal that individual attitudes are fleeting or uninformed, it may be that certain individuals prefer government policies in the domestic context but oppose them or prefer different policies in the international domain. Again, future work looking at a large set of domestic and foreign policy pairs would help to make more sense of the exact nature of their relationship.

Finally, foreign policy orientation appears to be a factor of significant importance to both policy and preferences, yet there is a relative dearth of research on its determinants. The research here showed that at least among American respondents liberals are relatively split between internationalists and isolationists, but that ethnocentrism does not appear to be the primary mechanism behind this split. Instead, I demonstrated that there was a large difference in the beliefs about the moral obligation of the government (to help recipients of foreign aid). Future studies could be designed more directly to examine why liberal internationalists and isolationists vary on this dimension and the implications of split for other types of foreign policies.

8 Appendix

8.1 Figures




Figure 9: **Different Levels of Ethnocentrism and Beliefs about Government Obligations Among Liberals.** Measure of ethnocentrism taken from Kinder and Kam (2009). Sample limited to white respondents.

8.2 Vignette

News Article Experiment

U.S. Officials May Cut Government Hunger Relief Program Program Gives [Cash / Food] To [Poor Americans / The Poor Overseas]

WASHINGTON, D.C. –U.S. government officials are considering cutting a government hunger relief program. It helps 150,000 people living below the poverty line in [the United States / other countries]. Through the program, the U.S. government distributes [cash / food packages] to program recipients. It costs the U.S. government \$100 million each year. Officials hope to reach a decision about the program soon.



People at program distribution center. Photo: AGP news

8.3 Tables

Country	Survey	Time Period	Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
U.S.	Election Study	1990-2008	Aid Support	0.49	0.5	0	1	5570
U.S.	Election Study	1990-2008	Ideology	1.156	0.815	0	2	5570
U.S.	Election Study	1990-2008	Internationalism	0.774	0.418	0	1	5570
U.S.	YouGov	2013	Aid Support	0.552	0.498	0	1	1000
U.S.	YouGov	2013	Ideology	0.904	0.833	0	2	915
U.S.	YouGov	2013	Internationalism	0.485	0.5	0	1	1000
UK	SSI	2014	Aid Support	0.317	0.465	0	1	1169
UK	SSI	2014	Ideology	4.819	2.122	0	10	1169
UK	SSI	2014	Internationalism	0.435	0.496	0	1	1169
Norway	Citizen Panel	2014	Aid Support (Bi)	0.769	0.422	0	1	844
Norway	Citizen Panel	2014	Aid Support (Tri)	0.991	0.674	0	2	844
Norway	Citizen Panel	2014	Ideology	4.96	2.243	0	10	828
Norway	Citizen Panel	2014	Internationalism	0.765	0.424	0	1	826

Note: ANES summary statistics only for observations with no missingness on any variables.

Table 8: **Summary statistics**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Ideology	0.16*** (0.024)	0.15*** (0.024)	0.09** (0.041)	0.13*** (0.040)
Internationalism	0.76*** (0.113)	0.72*** (0.117)	0.31 (0.249)	0.41* (0.225)
Ideology*Internationalism			0.09* (0.051)	0.06 (0.045)
Education		0.20* (0.106)	0.19* (0.107)	0.28*** (0.084)
Woman		0.21** (0.105)	0.22** (0.106)	0.06 (0.081)
Age		-0.06* (0.034)	-0.07* (0.035)	-0.08*** (0.027)
Employed		-0.01 (0.107)	-0.02 (0.107)	-0.02 (0.084)
National Economy		0.09 (0.060)	0.09 (0.060)	0.09** (0.046)
Constant	-0.55*** (0.138)	-0.95** (0.392)	-0.70* (0.417)	
Cut 1				0.74** (0.349)
Cut 2				2.47*** (0.353)
DV	Binary	Binary	Binary	Ordered
Observations	816	815	815	815
Pseudo R2	0.12	0.13	0.13	0.12
Log likelihood	-389.52	-382.43	-380.78	-726.54

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Note: The table reports probit and ordered probit coefficient estimates. The dependent variable in Models 1-3 is a binary indicator coded 1 if respondents said the government should maintain or increase foreign aid spending and coded 0 if respondents said the government should decrease foreign aid spending. The dependent variable in Model 4 is ordinal and coded 0 if respondents said to decrease foreign aid spending, coded 1 if respondents said to maintain current foreign aid spending, and coded 2 if respondents said to increase foreign aid spending. Higher values of ideology correspond to the liberal end of the spectrum. Heteroskedastic - consistent robust standard errors are in parentheses. All results are unweighted.

Table 9: **Predictors of Foreign Aid Support in Norway 2014**

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